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The aim of this paper is to estimate income advantages arising from publicly provided educa-
tion and to analyse their impact on the income distribution in Germany. Using representative 
micro-data from the SOEP and considering regional and education-specific variation, from a 
cross-sectional perspective the overall result is the expected levelling effect. When estimating 
the effects of accumulated educational transfers over the life course within a regression 
framework, however, and controlling for selectivity of households with children as potential 
beneficiaries of educational transfers, we find evidence that social inequalities are increasing 
from an intergenerational perspective, reinforced in particular by public transfers for non-
compulsory education, thus negating any social equalisation effects achieved within the com-
pulsory education framework.  
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1  Introduction 
The German government is widely criticized for its comparatively low investments in the 
educational system as compared to other OECD countries. In 2002, total public expenditures 
for education amounted to 4.4% of GDP, placing Germany at 20
th out of 28 OECD countries. 
Furthermore, decomposing public expenditures on education by educational level shows that 
Germany spends particularly little on pre-primary, primary and secondary schools, revealing a 
lower value assigned to the early stages of educational development. This situation, together 
with generally poor performance of students in early education and wide social inequalities 
among secondary schools identified by PISA and other international school studies, has trig-
gered the demand for increased public spending on education in general and especially the 
early stages. The federal state of Berlin, for example, has announced plans to exempt pre-
primary education from parental fees. At the same time, sweeping reforms of the German 
university system designed to improve German universities’ rankings among international 
higher educational institutions have involved the introduction of tuition fees for public univer-
sities, which had previously been free of charge. These are only two examples of broader 
redistribution efforts underway in the allocation of public budgets across different levels of 
the educational system. 
Public spending on education is a key concern not only for educational policy but also for 
social policy. Although in contrast to other European countries, Germany has historically 
separated educational from social policy, both institutionally and conceptually, in recent years 
educational policy has gradually come to be seen as one component of overall social policy 
(Allmendinger 1999). On the one hand, education often operates as the key factor defining 
later life chances, with specific educational diplomas acting to either restrict or enlarge young 
people’s labour market opportunities and their potentials to develop particular life skills.1 On 
the other hand, however, public spending on education acts as a mode of economic redistribu-
tion, with publicly provided education offering a specific kind of income advantage or non-
cash income component to recipient households, that is, to households with members attend-
ing public schools. As such, this type of income advantage should be understood not only as 
qualitative support for educational processes and careers but also as an important form of 
quantitative economic support. These advantages pay off in particular for low-income house-
                                                                          
1 See e.g. Müller and Shavit (1998) on the relevance of such institutional arrangements and the potential stratification effects 
emerging from a cross-national comparative perspective. 1 Introduction 
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holds with many children, ensuring their participation in educational institutions and poten-
tially even keeping them out of poverty and economic hardship.2  
To date, however, the distributional impact of publicly provided education has only been 
debated in any depth in relation to higher education subsidies. It was Milton Friedman (1962: 
105) who started this debate in the early 1960s by asserting that public subsidies to higher 
education produce a “perverse distribution of income” from low-income to high-income fami-
lies. This position has “become part of the conventional wisdom in the economics of educa-
tion” (Barbaro 2003: 458), although the actual evidence is ambiguous if not contradictory 
(Janeba/Kemnitz/Ehrhart 2007; Borgloh et al. 2007). Compared to previous research on the 
distributional impact of publicly provided higher (university) education (see e.g. Grüske 1994, 
Lemelin 1992, Blaug 1982, Crean 1975), the present study attempts to broaden the focus by 
considering the impact not only of tertiary education but also of public pre-primary, primary 
and secondary schools. We believe that the overall impact of public education on the income 
distribution can be addressed adequately only by taking these lower educational levels into 
account as well. This idea is supported by empirical evidence that distributional effects differ 
among the various education levels (Antoninis/Tsakloglou 2001). By starting from this as-
sumption, we also emphasize the relevance of differentiating compulsory from non-
compulsory education.  
In order to provide a solid baseline for discussing the re-distributional effects of public educa-
tional expenditures, in this paper we address the general incidence of public educational trans-
fers, varying across type of education and region, as well as its impact on income distribution 
and poverty in Germany in the year 2002. As such, this analysis may serve as a starting point 
for further analyses and simulation studies of the distributional impacts of educational reforms 
in Germany.  
This approach entails several restrictions that should be kept in mind from the outset regard-
ing potential conclusions about educational financing reforms and their long-term conse-
quences. First, although the analysis at hand focuses on the distributional effects of (total) 
public expenditures on education, we do not explicitly take into account taxes paid by the 
                                                                          
2 In welfare states the redistribution of income and economic wellbeing generally takes place not only through the tax system 
and cash transfers but to also a large extent through public services in areas such as health and education. However, these re-
distributional effects are frequently not taken fully into account in theoretical analyses of welfare states, and even less so in 
comparative empirical analyses of income distributions—particularly for OECD countries. For developing countries, there 
exists a larger body of literature dealing with the effect of public spending on the distribution of economic wellbeing (see van 
de Walle and Nead 1995; Fields 1975). Moreover, empirical studies on inequality usually rely on distributions of disposable 
monetary income, disregarding non-cash incomes arising from private sources or from the public provision of services. Thus, 1 Introduction 
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households. Instead, we look strictly at the destinations of public transfers: where the money 
ends up and not where it comes from.3  
Second, we do not provide any analysis of the distributional effects of public educational 
transfers across the life course. This would require time-series data of estimates of public 
expenditures per student, which could then be linked with longitudinal data on the educational 
careers of a given cohort, but such data are not readily available. We should keep in mind, 
however, that benefits from publicly provided educational services accumulate over the life 
course, and as such, the sum of transfers enjoyed (at a given point in time) may also vary 
considerably across individuals.  
Third, although our analysis intends to depict redistribution effects of public education, the 
effects of changes in the financing of the educational system cannot be estimated without 
making broad assumptions within the static simulation procedures since educational decisions 
are likely to be sensitive to opportunity costs.  
Keeping these restrictions in mind, the following analysis depicts the impact of public educa-
tional transfers on income distribution and poverty in Germany. This allows us to examine 
who benefits most from public education at each level of the educational system in the year 
2002. Moreover, it allows us to address the three main factors driving these results. First, a 
given household’s total benefits from public education will depend on the number of house-
hold members (i.e., children) attending school, which may be expected to vary with income. 
Second, it will depend on the participation rates at the various levels of the educational sys-
tem. Since participation at the higher, non-compulsory levels may be strongly associated with 
social and educational background, this will lead to higher benefits for higher income groups 
or social classes. Third, the resulting effect of these two conflicting factors will be moderated 
by the structure of public expenditures across the different levels of the educational system. 
The paper is organized into four sections. In the following Section 2, we give a description of 
the educational system in Germany. In the third section, we present the data on aggregated 
public spending for education per student and describe how this data was merged with the 
                                                                          
the picture of the income distribution may be significantly altered once non-cash income components are taken into account 
(see Smeeding et al. 1993). 
3 An analysis of the net effects of taxes paid and educational transfers received may require a more comprehensive mi-
crosimulation of taxes and transfers along the lines of the proportionality approach (see e.g., Grüske 1994, Barbaro 2003, 
Borgloh et al. 2007). However, this approach is based on a well-defined link between taxes (government revenues) and 
specific public transfers. Alternatively, one may argue against this proportionality assumption by assuming the tax system to 
be rather exogenous instead. Along these lines, it should be noted that the proportionality approach contradicts the progres-
sivity  built into the redistributive function of taxation as such.   2 The Educational System in Germany 
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micro-dataset of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) providing a representative 
picture of the population living in private households in Germany from 2002 on. The fourth 
section contains the empirical analysis of the impact of educational benefits on the income 
distribution and poverty rates from both a cross-sectional and a “life course” perspective. 
Section five concludes. 
2  The Educational System in Germany 
The educational system in the Federal Republic of Germany is organised into four stages: pre-
school, primary school, secondary school, and tertiary education (see Figure 1). Starting with 
the secondary level, it is subdivided further into different tracks based on individual ability. 
Given that education is mainly under the authority of the federal states (Bundesländer), Ger-
many’s educational system is regionally fragmented. However, there are similarities in struc-
ture. Most children have to decide after either grade four or grade six whether they will attend 
lower secondary school (Hauptschule), intermediate secondary school (Realschule), or col-
lege-track secondary school (Gymnasium). This early choice often predetermines the young 
person’s school career and subsequent labour market opportunities (see also Blossfeld 1993, 
Müller et al. 1998, Müller and Shavit 1998).  
In Germany, the educational system has traditionally been public and free of charge in large 
part, at least until recently. Thus in 2002, only about 6% of all young people went to private 
schools (StaBu 2002: 16) and less than 2% were enrolled in private universities (StaBu 2005a: 
10). All public schools and public universities are almost free of charge, and only pre-school 
(Kindergarten) is subject to a fee.  
2.1  (Pre-)Primary Education 
Children regularly enter the educational system at the age of three or four upon entering pre-
primary education (known in Germany as Kindergarten). Attendance either full-time or part-
time is voluntary, but all children are entitled by law to receive a Kindergarten slot from the 
age of three on. In 2002, only 10.9% of children aged 4 to 6 did not attend Kindergarten in 
Germany (KMK 2006: 77). Pre-schools operated by churches and social organisations run 
Kindergartens for about 60% of Germany’s children, for which they receive government 
funding (DJI 2005: 140). 
 2 The Educational System in Germany 
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Subject to having attained a sufficient level of development, children enter primary school at 
the age of six. In primary school (Grundschule), students attend heterogeneous classes that do 
not separate young people according to their individual abilities through the fourth grade 
(sixth grade for the federal states of Berlin and Brandenburg). Following primary school, at 
the age of about ten, the German school system separates children of differing abilities into 
different educational tracks. The transition from primary school to one of the secondary 
school tracks, where young people remain at least until completion of full-time compulsory 
education (ninth grade), is dealt with differently depending on the state’s legislation. The 
decision on which track the student will enter is made partly by the school, which makes a 
recommendation based on criteria such as academic achievement, potential, and personality 
characteristics, which can also be influenced by in-depth consultations with the parents. The 
final decision is left up to the parents in most federal states, and in the others to schools or 
school authorities. Also, in some states the selection process is delayed for an additional two 
years for further “orientation” (grades five and six). This is the case for about one quarter of 
all pupils. 
2.2  Secondary Education 
2.2.1  Secondary General School 
The secondary general school system is divided into various educational tracks, with their 
respective certificates of graduation and differing qualifications. Also, the same certificate 
may be attained from different school types.  
The traditional track is lower secondary school (Hauptschule), which provides a basic general 
education as a basis for practical vocational training. In 2002, about 24% of the children leav-
ing primary school after either grade four (or after “orientation” grades five and six) went into 
this kind of educational institution.4 Grades five to nine are compulsory, and grade ten is usu-
ally voluntary. Over one-third of secondary general school students in grade nine stay on for a 
tenth year. In 2002, about 70.4% of all students leaving the secondary school level from a 
Hauptschule did so with a Hauptschule certificate, 16.0% left with a Realschule certificate 
(only after completing grade ten) and 13.6% dropped out without graduating.  
                                                                          
4 If not otherwise stated, the numbers reported in the text are calculated from StaBu 2002: 32-35. 2 The Educational System in Germany 
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Alternatively to Hauptschule, young people can also attend intermediate school (Realschule). 
These schools reach from grade five (or seven) to grade ten. Graduation from Realschule 
generally provides the basis for higher training in all mid-level occupations. In 2002, 23.7% 
of all children leaving primary school entered Realschule. 92.5% of Realschule students 
graduate with a Realschule certificate, and 5.3% graduate with a Hauptschule certificate. The 
Realschule drop-out rate is 2.2%, i.e., considerably lower than in case of Hauptschule. Par-
ticularly in some of the East German federal states, Realschule and Hauptschule are pooled 
together into what is known as “multi-track secondary school” (Schule mit mehreren 
Bildungsgängen). About 9% of each age cohort attend this combined school form. 
The third path in the German school system is the academic track (Gymnasium), which has 
become the most popular of the three: 33.9% of all young people attend this school type after 
completing primary school. Gymnasium  usually lasts eight or nine years (grades five to 
twelve or thirteen) or, as the case may be, seven years (grades seven to thirteen).5 Graduation 
from college-track secondary school (the Abitur, functionally equivalent to British A-levels) 
qualifies young people to apply for all institutions of higher education. In 2002, 85.7% of all 
students leaving college-track secondary school graduated with the Abitur, while 12.3% left 
with a Realschule certificate. The very small share of 1.4% of Gymnasium students left 
school with a Hauptschule graduation certificate, and less than 1% dropped out without any 
certificate.  
An alternative to the traditional tripartite school system are comprehensive schools (Gesam-
tschulen). They combine the different types of secondary schools in various organizational 
and curricular forms. There are integrated comprehensive schools (joint classes for all stu-
dents) as well as additive and cooperative comprehensive schools (where the various types of 
secondary schools exist side by side on the same premises). These schools are not found in all 
the German states. The Gesamtschule arose out of a social movement in the 1960s promoting 
the idea of a more egalitarian educational system. Most of the Gesamtschulen are located in 
states traditionally governed by the Social Democratic Party. 9.9% of all students who gradu-
ated in 2002 received their certificate from a Gesamtschule. 
Finally, about 4% of each age group attends a special school for handicapped persons, where 
they can attain a special degree for people with learning difficulties. 
                                                                          
5 In 2002 only schools in Saxony and Thuringia (recent also in the federal state of Berlin) finished after twelve years instead 
of the usual thirteen. There are also college-track secondary schools covering only grades eleven to thirteen, which are open 
to young people who have already completed intermediate-track secondary school. 2 The Educational System in Germany 
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2.2.2  Secondary Vocational School 
One unique element of the German vocational education is the dual system. It is based on the 
close connection between vocational part-time school and on-the-job-training in a firm. This 
entire system depends on the willingness of companies in the particular industry – especially 
medium-sized businesses – to provide adequate apprenticeships. The dual system has been 
successful in designing specialized vocational education programmes to fit the occupational 
structures of the labour market (Gangl/Müller 2003). But the system is now in crisis due to its 
increasing inability to provide enough vocational training positions for the number of appli-
cants. This has been caused by the weak German economy and by an increasing number of 
Abitur-holders who choose the dual system over university because it takes less time to attain 
a degree and may offer more secure prospects of getting a job. Today, many companies only 
award the more prestigious, better-paid apprenticeships to Gymnasium or at least Realschule 
graduates. This creates an incentive to avoid attending lower secondary school (Hauptschule). 
Another problem with the German educational system is that people with low education have 
very low chances of getting a job if they have not completed the dual system or another voca-
tional school. 
Besides vocational schools in the dual system, there are a range of full-time vocational 
schools for special occupational fields, such as schools for health-related occupations (Schule 
für Gesundheitswesen), schools preparing for public services (Beamtenschulen) or other topic 
related schools (Fachschulen). Usually, these vocational schools are open to Abitur-holders, 
but may impose additional requirements.6 
2.3  Tertiary Education 
Universities are the traditional form of higher education in Germany providing courses on a 
broad range of subjects. Universities combine teaching with research, and have the right to 
award doctoral degrees. The university system in Germany is publicly financed and has been 
largely free of charge up to the present. Depending on the parents’ income, students can also 
receive financial support (according to the Bundesausbildungsförderungs-Gesetz BAföG) to 
cover their living expenses. There is no well-developed scholarship system in Germany. The 
                                                                          
6 The distinction between secondary general and vocational schools that we will use subsequently in this report contrasts 
against the international classification of lower, upper and (non-tertiary) post-secondary schools, at least in some cases. The 
vocational schools outside the dual system thus belong to either upper secondary or post-secondary schools, and the various 
types of secondary general schools may include the upper secondary as well as the lower secondary level (see Hetmeier 2004: 
2). 2 The Educational System in Germany 
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average duration of study for students who obtained a university degree in 2002 was 6.8 years 
(Heublein/Schwarzenberger 2005: 1). 
The number of university graduates has traditionally been very low in Germany in compari-
son to other OECD countries (OECD 2006). Because of this as well as the Bologna Declara-
tion of 1999 and other EU agreements, the German university system has been undergoing 
sweeping reform in recent years.7 Bachelor’s and master’s degrees have been established to 
reduce the length of university studies and to make the system more comprehensible and 
effective.  
Universities of applied science (Fachhochschulen) and colleges of public administration were 
established to provide practical training in occupations requiring scientific knowledge and 
methods or creative and artistic skills. These schools offer courses of study mainly in the 
fields of engineering, economics, social sciences, agriculture, and design. These schools have 
been successful because of their more flexible orientation towards the changing situation on 
the labour market. The average duration of study for students who graduated from a Fach-
hochschule in 2002 was 5.4 years, thus about 1.4 years less than for university students 
(Heublein/Schwarzenberger 2005: 1). About three-quarters of all students attending tertiary 
education in Germany choose the university and about one-quarter choose universities of 
applied sciences. 
2.4  Regional Differences 
The Federal Republic of Germany is made up of 16 federal states, each of them with its own 
government, its own ministry of education and a distinctive set of political, religious, and 
cultural traditions. Educational legislation and the administration of the educational system 
are primarily within the jurisdiction of the states, although specific policies and practices are 
being gradually aligned by the “Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cul-
tural Affairs” (Kultusministerkonferenz KMK). The Federal Government is responsible for 
vocational training within the dual system as described above and for the promotion of scien-
tific research. 
It is important to note that significant regional differences exist in Germany’s education sys-
tem. The Christian parties that hold parliamentary power mainly in the southern federal states 
strongly identify with the tripartite system and the fostering of an academic elite, while the 
                                                                          
7 See http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/ [accessed March 1, 2007]. 2 The Educational System in Germany 
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Social Democrats have encouraged school reform as a means of increasing equality of educa-
tional opportunities. As a result, many aspects of schooling in the states of central and north-
ern Germany differ from those in the southern German states, despite the fact that all states 
have basically the same educational structure and core curriculum (e.g., an Abitur obtained in 
a given federal state is accepted for university access in any other federal state). 
2.5  Social Inequalities 
The German educational system is characterized by comparatively high social inequalities in 
educational attainment (Shavit/Blossfeld 1993; Baumert/Schümer 2001). This is due to low 
investments in compensatory education in the early stages of schooling and child develop-
ment, since primary education is only part-time and starts relatively late in the life course. On 
this ground, the very early and rigid selection that takes place at the transition from primary to 
secondary education is the main cause for the strong dependency of educational attainment on 
the social and educational origins (Schimpl-Neimanns 2000; Becker/Schubert 2006). The 
importance of the early selection process is reinforced by the fact that the educational system 
– and thus the quality of a person’s education and training – strongly determines his or her 
individual chances of finding a job on the labour market, resulting in high stability of educa-
tional inequalities from both, intra-generational as well as intergenerational perspective 
(Gangl/Müller 2003).8 
Whereas the structure of educational attendance has changed dramatically in the past five 
decades, with the proportion of children obtaining only a Hauptschule graduation certificate 
declining from about 80% in the 1950s to almost 20%, the odds of obtaining an Abitur for 
children of different social and/or educational backgrounds has remained remarkably constant 
(Schimpl-Neimanns 2000). At the same time, graduation from a track higher than the Haupt-
schule level has basically become a precondition for better-paid jobs, not to mention individ-
ual chances on the marriage market. Thus the rapidly declining number of children graduating 
with lower certificates results in an ever more accentuated discrimination against these indi-
viduals on the labour market and in society as a whole (Solga 2002). This paradoxical effect 
of educational expansion leads to a structural convergence between educational inequalities 
and increased social divisions within German society overall. 
                                                                          
8 There is a large body of literature on the effects of social origin, income poverty and parental educational background on 
the educational attainment of children based in large part on data from the German SOEP (see e.g. Büchel and Duncan 1998, 
Büchel et al. 2001, Kreyenfeld et al. 2003). It seems most useful to also include pre-primary education in such analysis (see 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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3  Public Expenditures on Education  
In the following we focus exclusively on public expenditures for education to derive the 
monetary value of publicly provided education services. We assume public expenditures on 
education to operate as an income advantage or transfer, which adds to the net household 
income of the household where the pupil or student is living.9 Therefore, we first have to 
estimate the average amount of public expenditures per student, which is calculated as total 
public expenditures on a certain kind of school divided by the total number of students attend-
ing this type of school. We use national statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany (StaBu) to estimate these figures and link them to the micro-dataset of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). 
Taking into account the regional differences and institutional diversity of the education sys-
tem in Germany, we seek to capture as much variance of educational transfers as possible.10 
The official statistics on educational expenditures allow us to distinguish 14 educational cate-
gories ranging from pre-primary to higher tertiary institutions, at the level of the 16 federal 
states. Nevertheless, not every cell within the resulting matrix (14 school types times 16 fed-
eral states) is valid, because not all of the different types of secondary schools actually exist in 
every one of the German states. There are some special types of educational institutions for 
which we derived educational expenditures separately, but we were not able to identify them 
in the SOEP micro-data. This is especially the case for schools for handicapped children, who 
show by far the highest expenditures per student, but only about 4% of students attend this 
school type. On the other hand, some types of educational institutions can be distinguished in 
SOEP, but there are no figures on their educational expenditures. This is the case for different 
vocational schools outside the dual system. In fact, our matrix of public educational expendi-
tures per student leaves us with 187 valid combinations of “school type” and “federal state” 
that could be linked with respondents in SOEP, providing us with sufficient variance among 
student benefits (see Table 3 at the end of this chapter). 
                                                                          
e.g. Spiess et al. 2003 and Büchel et al. 1997). For previous analysis on the distributional impact of higher education subsi-
dies, see Barbaro 2003 and Borgloh et al. 2007. 
9 This builds on the counterfactual consideration that in a totally private educational system, the household would have to pay 
for all educational services consumed by its members. Thus, adjustments of household income to household needs via 
equivalence scales are performed after adding the educational benefits of each student to net household income. 
10 See Wolf (2007) for a detailed analysis of regional disparities in educational expenditures in Germany. 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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3.1  Pre-Primary Education 
As mentioned above, primary schooling starts rather late in the life course of children in Ger-
many. To account for improved international comparability, we include public expenditures 
for pre-primary education in our analysis, but only for children aged four and above. As can 
be seen from column (1) of Table 1, about 88% of all pre-school children aged 4 to 7 attend 
Kindergarten. Within this group, the share of children attending Kindergarten full-time varies 
across German states, with much higher shares in the East and in Berlin. However, the sample 
size is too small to allow for substantive interpretation on the state level. 
Table 1: Pre-Primary Education 









time (vs.  
part-time) 
annual gross 
public benefits per 
child, full-time  
net public benefits 





Schleswig-Holstein 55.349  68,5  16,5  5000  1584  27
Lower Saxony  239.931  80,1  7,5  6100  2434  94
North Rhine-Westphalia  596.280  85,6  18,7  5500  2356  213
Hesse 290.334  95,5  23,2  5300  2383  106
Rhineland-Palatinate 188.212  79,5  32,1  4700  2419  69
Baden-Württemberg 421.986  96,4  28,7  4600  2203  173
Bavaria 342.288  83,9  17,8  4500  1903  167
Saarland 37.916  100,0  13,5  4900  2145  17
Hamburg 33.879  86,3  52,5  6100  3384  14
Bremen 12.026  87,8  14,9  6000  2463  6
Berlin 87.788  92,8  74,1  6200  4580  29
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania  32.962 95,4  67,3  2900  1572  18
Brandenburg 27.738  89,8  53,4  3900  2311  22
Saxony-Anhalt 33.213  91,0  47,2  4600  2555  20
Thuringia 47.034  92,4  54,4  3700  1884  29
Saxony 94.301  94,0  62,7  3400  2064  55
Germany 2.541.237  87,6  26,6  5000  2328  1059
* Based on all children, after deduction of private fees and adjusted for time actually spent in the institution as 
well as possible costs for lunch. 
Source: SOEP 2002, Schilling (2006) 
 
The data on pre-school public benefits used in this study is not readily available from official 
statistics and has been provided by Matthias Schilling from the Dortmunder Arbeitsstelle 
Kinder- und Jugendhilfestatistik. For Thuringia and Hamburg, the calculated costs are not 
plausible according to Schilling (2006), so the weighted average of the eastern states has been 
assigned to Thuringia, and the weighted average of the city-states of Bremen and Berlin has 
been assigned to Hamburg. Since the data provided by Schilling are for 2003, we deflated 
these costs by the factor 1.0245 to obtain prices for 2001, assuming no substantial differences 
in public expenditures for pre-primary education between 2001 and 2003.11 Column (4) of 
Table 1 gives gross public expenditures per child attending Kindergarten fulltime. For chil-
dren attending Kindergarten part-time, we simply assign half of the cost of a full-time slot. 
For children who attend part-time but still have lunch at Kindergarten, an additional 5% of a 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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regular full-time slot is added (see Schilling 2006). As can be seen, households in the eastern 
states receive far less (gross) education transfers at the pre-primary level than those in the 
Western German states. 
As described above, Kindergarten is the only public educational institution in Germany that 
imposes fees on parents depending on household income and needs. Thus, private fees have to 
be subtracted from public expenditures in order to obtain net public benefits for pre-primary 
education. The corresponding information on tuition fees for child care is available in SOEP.12 
Column (5) of Table 1 gives the mean values of net public transfers per child regardless of 
whether they attend full-time or part-time. Due to the higher percentage of full-time attendees 
and lower fees in eastern Germany, the difference between East and West in gross public 
expenditures (for a full-time slot) declines to almost zero, whereas the city states, and espe-
cially Berlin, now show remarkably high net public transfers. 
3.2  Primary and Secondary Schools 
The data on public expenditures on education per student for primary and secondary schools 
are taken from calculations by the Federal Statistical Office.13 In principle, these data can be 
linked directly with the SOEP without further modification.14 The costs per student include 
current investment costs, school administration costs, and pension funds for teachers.15  
3.3  Tertiary Education 
Public expenditures per student for tertiary education are calculated separately for universities 
and for universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). The Federal Statistical Office 
provides detailed statistics on aggregated income levels and expenditures on different institu-
tions of tertiary education. This allows calculating different types of expenditures separately. 
Table 2 shows personnel costs, other ongoing costs and investment costs per student. These 
                                                                          
11 We deflated to 2001 values, the income year used in the following. 
12 In cases of missing values due to item-non-response (n=48), fees have been imputed by means of OLS-regression-based 
imputation (with R
2=0.23, based on valid n=934). 
13 These calculations are provided regularly by the Statistical Office from 2002 on. Source: 
http://www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bildung6.php.  
14 There is only one exception: the costs of vocational schools outside the dual system had to be calculated from the 
(weighted) difference of total costs for all vocational schools and costs for vocational schools in the dual system. 
15 Costs of pension funds for teachers account for the old-age pensions that teachers receive from special state funds for civil 
servants. 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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add up to total expenditures per student (not shown in Table 2). However, two important 
adjustments have to be made to obtain adequate figures: 
First of all, public expenditures on tertiary education include expenditures for medical institu-
tions such as university-run hospitals. The expenditures of university medical institutions 
account for nearly half (46%) of the total expenditures of tertiary education institutions (in-
cluding universities of applied sciences). However, this includes all costs for medical atten-
dance and administration which should not be considered as public subsidization of the educa-
tional system. Thus, these expenditures, together with the number of medical students in the 
denominator, have been excluded from calculations of third-level education costs per student.  
Second, within the remaining total expenditures per student (sum of rows 1-3), costs for re-
search and development (R&D) are included. Based on the fundamental idea guiding the 
German university system since Humboldt that research and teaching be unified, costs for 
research and development are not provided separately in university accounting data and thus 
can only be roughly estimated. The Federal Statistical Office performs such estimations based 
on a complex set of assumptions (StaBu 2004). The shaded row of Table 2 gives the figures 
on R&D spent per student. R&D costs make up approximately 40% of total expenditures on 
tertiary education. To calculate public expenditures on tertiary education we aggregated per-
sonnel costs, investment costs, and other ongoing costs, and deducted costs for research and 
development.16 The resulting figures are given in row (5) of Table 2 for universities and 
Fachhochschulen (universities of applied sciences) separately. 
Here we see that once R&D is excluded, public expenditures per student no longer differ 
between universities and universities of applied sciences. A striking result is that costs per 
student are far higher in the eastern states. This is mainly due to higher recent investment 
costs incurred by the expansion of tertiary education in the East after the fall of the Berlin 
wall in late 1989.17  
                                                                          
16 Personnel costs in the national statistics do not include pension funds for professors (which are included in costs for 
primary and secondary education), although they are included in the calculations passed to the OECD. Administrative fees 
(Studiengebühren) need not to be subtracted, because they are not included in the expenditure figures used. 
17 Calculating running averages for the investment costs of the last ten years would probably even increase these differences 
further. 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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Table 2: Public Expenditures for Tertiary Education per student in euro 







University         
   (1) personnel costs  6.659 6.547 6.608 7.381 
   (2) other ongoing costs  2.446 2.519 2.396 2.066 
   (3) investment costs  980 815 634 2.320 
   (4) R&D included in (1)-(3)  4.757 4.770 4.248 5.211 
   (5) Total Costs w/o R&D  5.329 5.111 5.390 6.558 
Applied Sciences         
   (1) personnel costs  3.846 3.714 3.614 4.688 
   (2) other ongoing costs  1.264 1.272 1.168 1.287 
   (3) investment costs  836 691 676 1.689 
   (4) R&D included in (1)-(3)  596 594 665 557 
   (5) Total Costs w/o R&D  5.350 5.084 4.792 7.107 
Unweighted means.  
Public expenditures for the medical institutions of universities are excluded. 
Source: StaBu 2004. 
 
3.4  Synopsis 
In Tables 3 and 4 we present the resulting matrix of educational expenditures per student and 
the projected distribution of students in our sample compared with national statistics. 
Annual costs per student are quite low at pre-primary level (€2,300, see Table 3). At primary 
schools, public transfers per student are €3,900 p.a. on average, ranging between €3,200 in 
Brandenburg to as much as €5,300 in Thuringia. Secondary education receives somewhat 
higher subsidies than primary education. The German average ranges from €2,100 for voca-
tional education in the “dual system” to more than €5,000 for upper secondary schools and as 
much as €11,500 for special schools for handicapped people, which cannot be identified in 
SOEP. Comparing the benefits across various types of secondary schools, intermediate 
schools (€4,400), orientation grades five and six (€4,600) and schools with multiple tracks 
(€4,700) have the lowest costs per student, whereas the costs for lower secondary schools 
(€5,200), college-track schools (€5,300) and comprehensive schools (€5,600) are higher. 
Vocational schools outside the dual system show slightly higher costs per students (€5,700), 
whereas vocational schools within the dual system are much “cheaper” (€2,100) due to being 
only part-time. Furthermore, public expenditures per student for universities (€5,300) and 
universities of applied sciences (€5,400) are again very similar after deducting costs for re-
search and development. Thus, there seems to be no clear relation between the hierarchy of 
the school system and public spending overall. 
 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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* Figures for pre-primary are rounded means of net individual transfers for childcare after deduction of parental fees actually paid for childcare. 




    Secondary General Schools Vocational  Tertiary 
   





orientation lower  middle  multiple 
tracks 
compre-
hensive  college  special  dual system other  applied 
sciences  university 
Schleswig-Holstein  1600  3600  4700  4400    5500  10800  2400 5900 4800 4000 
Lower  Saxony  2400 3900 4500 5200 4500      5600  11400  2000 5600 5600 6600 
West 
Germany 
North  Rhine-Westphalia  2400  3700  5000  4000  5600  5200  11700  2100 5600 4900 4200 
  Hesse  2400 3600 4700 5500 4900    5000 4800  12200  2400 5500 4200 4700 
  Rhineland-Palatinate  2400 3800    5000 4000 4600    5300 9900  1900 5600 5100 4800 
  Baden-Württemberg  2200  3800  5100  4400    5800  13600  2300 6200 5800 6600 
  Bavaria  1900  4100  5500  5000    6100  9300  2200 6400 5000 5800 
  Saarland  2100  3600      4100  4500  4800  11600  2200 5200 5400 5200 
Bremen  2500 4200 4900 5300 4300    5400 5500  15200  2300 5800 5000 6900 
Hamburg  3400  5800  6300    7100  6100  14900  2800 6900 4500 6100 
City 
States 
Berlin  4600  4500  5500  4700  6600  5500  13500  2200 5300 4900 4800 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania  1600 3800    5200 3900 4400    4100 9200  1700 3900 7500 6100 
Brandenburg  2300  3200  4300  3600  4800  4100  10900  2000 3100 7200 5700 
East 
Germany 
Saxony-Anhalt  2600  4500  4300    5000  4700  10500  1800 4800 7600 8800 
  Thuringia  1900  5300      5300  5300  10900  2100 5100 7200 7200 
  Saxony  2100  4400      4300  4800  11300  1800 4100 6500 5900 
Germany  2300 3900 4600 5200 4400 4700 5600 5300  11500  2100 5700 5400 5300 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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Having a closer look at the regional variation, there emerges a clear picture about city-states 
with higher expenditures per student for all school forms. For pre-primary and primary educa-
tion, there seems to be no general difference between eastern and western states. But starting 
from intermediate secondary schools, a regional hierarchy appears, with eastern states show-
ing the lowest public expenditures per student, city-states the highest, and western states ex-
penditures ranging in between. This ranking is reverted again for tertiary education, where 
now the eastern states have the highest costs per students due to the higher investment costs. 
In Table 4 we compare the projected number of students per educational level calculated in 
SOEP with the corresponding figures from the national statistics. For pre-primary education, 
we present numbers of childcare slots in Germany at the end of year 2002, which exactly fits 
the projected number of children attending Kindergarten in our database. For children in pri-
mary school, the SOEP sample closely resembles the population figures in the national statis-
tics. Looking at the total rows, the deviations between SOEP and national statistics on secon-
dary and vocational students are still in the acceptable range of +/- 7%. 
 
Table 4: Population of Students (SOEP vs. National Statistics) 
      SOEP  StaBu  Deviation SOEP-StaBu  SOEP 
     in private HH    abs  in %  non-private HH 
Pre-Primary fulltime  675,648 --        0 
   part-time plus lunch  671,716 --       0 
   part-time  1,193,873 --       0 
   Total Pre-Primary  2,541,237 2,550,399  -9,162 -0.4  0 
Primary     3,135,663 3,211,486 -75,823 -2.4  1,851
Secondary  orientation grades (five and six)  256,554 387,365 -130,811 -33.8   
   lower secondary  1,163,593 1,113,954 49,639 4.5 5,745
   intermediate secondary 1,368,873 1,277,739 91,134 7.1  1,192
   schools with multiple tracks  482,799 440,512 42,287 9.6  2,247
   comprehensive schools 689,086 531,151 157,935 29.7  1,851
   college track  2,593,871 2,284,326 309,545 13.6 1,771
   other / not assignable  506,611 561,084 -54,473 -9.7  5,782
   Total Secondary  7,061,387 6,596,131 465,256 7.1 18,588
Vocational dual  system  1,595,370 1,784,368 -188,998 -10.6 8,096
   other vocational schools  906,977 909,807 -2,830 -0.3 1,355
   not assignable   29,460   29,460     
   Total Vocational  2,531,807 2,694,175 -162,368 -6.0 9,451
Tertiary university  1,353,897 1,328,941 24,956 1.9 36,500
   university of applied sciences 474,092 513,885 -39,793 -7.7 16,319
   not assignable   2,800   2,800     
   Total Tertiary  1,830,789 1,842,826 -12,037 -0.7 52,819
Total     17,100,883 16,895,017 205,866 1.2  82,709
Sample size   (SOEP)  7,255   48
Source: SOEP 2002, DJI 2005 (pre-primary), StaBu 2002 (primary and secondary), StaBu 2004 (tertiary). 
 
However, there are some fairly large deviations at the level of the various secondary schools. 
The SOEP sample overestimates the number of students at comprehensive schools and col-
lege-track schools, and underestimates the number of students in the “orientation” grades five 3 Public Expenditures on Education 
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and six. Partly, this can be explained by differences in the underlying timing of these meas-
ures. The student population refers to the beginning of the school year 2001/2002, which was 
August 2001. The educational participation of SOEP respondents refers to the time of inter-
view, which started in January 2002 with about 70% of the interviews conducted by March 
and more than 90% by May. Thus, the SOEP population figures refer to a point in time six or 
more months into the school year, in contrast to the national statistics. This might explain 
some of the failure to cover students in the “orientation” grades and also some deviations at 
secondary school levels, but it cannot explain the general overestimation of secondary stu-
dents. 
At the tertiary education level, the SOEP population of students in tertiary education again 
perfectly matches official statistics. In the last column, we report projected figures of students 
in non-private households, who by definition were excluded from our analysis. With this 
sample restriction we exclude students living in student accommodations (dormitories, stu-
dent residences, etc.), who are only partly covered by the survey frame of the SOEP due to the 
concept of following up on all respondents even when they move to institutional accommoda-
tion and thus drop out of the basic population of private households. As can be seen, there are 
only a few students excluded from our sample. In Germany, the share of students in tertiary 
education living in student accommodations was about 12% in 2003 (HIS 2004: 340), com-
pared to 3% in SOEP 2002. Students living in non-private households have to be excluded 
from the analysis at hand because no sufficiently reliable information on “household income” 
is available for them. Of course, a similar problem arises with students who live on their own 
in individual households because their incomes are usually low and, more important, often 
much lower than the actual financial resources at their disposal, which in most cases will 
include part of their parents’ incomes (who may be paying their rent, for example). This is 
why sensitivity analyses have been performed by including and excluding students not living 
with their parents (altogether with their fellow household members).18  
                                                                          
18 According to the SOEP about 40% of all students co-reside in parental households, whereas this share is about 22% 
according to the HIS-survey (based on over 20,000 interviewed students, see HIS 2004: 340). 4 Empirical Results 
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4 Empirical  Results 
4.1  Data and Methods 
The aggregated figures on public transfers for education as described in the previous section 
have been linked with micro-data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the sur-
vey year 2002. The SOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private 
households that provides yearly information on all household members, consisting of Ger-
mans living in the old and new German federal states, foreigners, and recent immigrants to 
Germany. The panel was started in 1984, and in 2002, there were over 12,000 households 
with more than 30,000 persons sampled (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005; SOEP-Group 
2001).  
The principle underlying the following analyses is to compare the situation of a baseline 
model using monetary annual equivalent post-government household income with the income 
situation after adding equivalent educational transfers. The modified OECD equivalence scale 
is applied (1; 0.5; 0.3). Based on the differentiated matrix of public transfers per student by 
educational institution and federal state, the impact of public education benefits on the overall 
income distribution will be analysed at a more aggregated level, in order to show possible 
differences by educational level. Thus, results presented throughout all tables differentiate 
between primary education (including pre-primary education benefits), secondary education 
(including all kinds of general secondary schools and vocational schools) and tertiary educa-
tion (including universities and universities of applied sciences).  
Separate estimates of the impact of public education benefits on household incomes and the 
income distribution as a whole will be presented, taking only benefits for compulsory educa-
tion into account. Compulsory education is here defined as primary (excluding pre-primary) 
and secondary general education up to the age of 15, the age by which the lowest possible 
secondary degree (Hauptschule degree) can be obtained.  
As mentioned above, students in tertiary education not living with their parents are excluded 
from the following analyses. Since these students are likely to be found at the bottom of the 
income distribution (although their parents may have higher incomes) adding public benefits 
for tertiary education to these students’ income might result in extreme changes in their rela-
tive income position. In other words, the available information on those persons` monetary 
income will most likely provide a biased picture of their true economic position. In order to 
provide empirical evidence of the underlying selectivity we also mention results from sensi-4 Empirical Results 
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tivity analysis including these students, however, without presenting empirical results in tabu-
lated form19. 
4.2  The Impact of Educational Transfers on Income Distribution and 
Poverty 
4.2.1 Population  Shares of Beneficiaries 
Table A1 shows the share of the entire population receiving any kind of public benefits for 
education, at least for one member of the household. This is the case for nearly half of the 
population (44.6%, column D1). At least 30% of the population receives benefits for house-
hold members in secondary education, and 21% for children attending (pre-)primary school. 
Only 3.1% of the population benefit from public transfers to tertiary education, either directly 
or via other household members (see columns A-C). Including the population living in house-
holds of students no longer living with their parents increases this figure to 4.8%. Thus, about 
1.5 million people are affected by this exclusion (as mentioned above, this figure includes co-
residents of these students). 
If only expenditures for compulsory education are taken into account, the overall number of 
beneficiaries is reduced from 44.6% to 27.7% (column D2). In other words, a substantial 
number of persons profit only from transfers related to non-compulsory education. On the 
other hand, there are also households that do not receive any kind of education benefit, al-
though at least some of their members could be attending (non-compulsory) schooling institu-
tions. About 16.8% of all persons (i.e., 100%-83.2%, column H1) live in such potential (but 
not actual) beneficiary households.20 There are only few people in the respective age brackets 
that do not attend primary or secondary school (including pre-primary education and voca-
tional school), but nearly 80% in potential tertiary education households do not attend univer-
sities (see columns E-G).21  
Accounting for differences across the income distribution, it can be seen from column D1 that 
almost half of the population of the first three income quintiles does benefit from public ex-
                                                                          
19  These complete results can be found in Frick et al. (2006).  
20 Potential recipient households are defined here as those with persons in specific age brackets that would allow them to 
attend specific schools. Children aged 4 to 15 are seen as potentially attending (pre-)primary and lower secondary school, 
young persons aged 16 to 21 are defined as potentially attending upper secondary school (including vocational schools) and 
persons aged 22 to 28 are defined as potentially in tertiary education, all of them independent of their qualification. These age 
brackets are derived from the de facto age distribution across educational institutions. 
21 Note that “potential” beneficiaries are defined by means of age only, i.e., we do not control for the individual’s qualifica-
tion to enter an institution of higher education. 4 Empirical Results 
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penditures on education, whereas in the higher income quintiles, this share declines to 42.6% 
(fourth quintile) and only 34.7% (top quintile). This pattern is similar for primary and secon-
dary education and simply reflects the fact that households in the higher income ranges com-
prise fewer children attending primary and secondary school. This is the case even though the 
educational participation rates (measured here as the share of those realising potential bene-
fits) are slightly higher in the higher income quintiles (see columns E and F).  
With respect to tertiary education, there are much higher shares of beneficiaries in the higher 
income quintiles. Also, participation rates at third level education are, as expected, much 
higher among higher incomes, ranging from 38% in the top quintile to only 6% in the bottom 
quintile (see column C in Table A1). Including students not living with their parents for sensi-
tivity reasons alters this linear relation between income position and participation in tertiary 
education into a U-shaped curve. In this case, due to the low income position of university 
students living on their own, we find higher shares of beneficiaries as well as higher participa-
tion rates also at the bottom quintile.  
4.2.2  Income Advantages from Public Educational Transfers 
Adding public educational transfers to the baseline income yields an overall increase in dis-
posable income of 7.7% (see Table A2, column F1). In line with the distribution of beneficiar-
ies, the increase in disposable income is highest for secondary education (4.9%), followed by 
primary education (2.3%) and finally, tertiary education (0.5%, and 0.9% respectively, if 
students no longer living with their parents are included). By restricting the analysis to public 
transfers for compulsory education only, the overall increase in income declines from 7.7% to 
4.4% (column F2 of Table A2). This picture is about the same across the entire income distri-
bution, where in all quintiles the corresponding income share is cut nearly in half if only 
compulsory education is taken into account. 
As expected, educational benefits have the greatest impact on low-income households, mak-
ing up as much as 21.7% of total adjusted household income in the lowest quintile.22 They are 
least relevant for the top quintile, accounting for only 3.0% of disposable income after adding 
education transfers (column F1 of Table A2). This difference across income quintiles is simi-
lar for primary and secondary education as well as for compulsory and non-compulsory edu-
cation. Again, transfers to tertiary education behave somewhat differently, since increase in 
                                                                          
22 It should be noted that in the baseline measure of our disposable household income direct cash transfers like student grants 
are already included. 4 Empirical Results 
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disposable incomes is rather small and identical across the income distribution. Only when 
including students who are no longer living with their parents there appears to be an apprecia-
ble increase in disposable incomes of 3% for the bottom quintile.  
Of course, the percentage increase of disposable income not only depends on the magnitude 
of educational transfers received – which by the very nature of the system are the same for 
any individual attending the same school in the same federal state – but also from the baseline 
monetary income to which these transfers are added. Obviously, the relative impact of the 
public education transfer ceteris paribus decreases with income. But furthermore, the amount 
of education transfers should be higher in the lower income groups due to the larger numbers 
of children and thus actual beneficiaries. This is in fact the case, as can be seen from columns 
G to J of Table A2 (“mean transfer per capita”). It is most pronounced for secondary educa-
tion, with persons in the lowest quintile receiving about €690 compared to €360 in the top 
quintile. Again, in the case of tertiary education, the picture is different and even reversed. 
However, transfers for tertiary education are on a lower level than for secondary and even 
primary education, and thus the different distribution across income groups does not change 
the overall pattern for secondary and primary education transfers. 
There might be at least two other reasons why low-income households in Germany appear to 
benefit more from public expenditures to education than high-income households in such 
cross-sectional perspective. First, transfers for primary education include transfers for pre-
primary education for children aged 4 and above, and these are means-tested (i.e., we only 
assign net transfers after deducting parental fees). In consequence, high-income households 
receive less (net) public transfers than low-income households. Second, public transfers for 
universities are significantly higher in Eastern Germany due to the recent increase in invest-
ment costs. Since low-income households are more likely to be found in eastern Germany, 
they will ceteris paribus receive higher transfers for tertiary education. It is most important to 
note that both of these additional issues relate to non-compulsory education.  
4.2.3 Impact  on  Income  Distribution and Poverty 
As can be expected from the analysis so far, the overall impact of educational transfers on the 
distribution of incomes is a decrease in inequality for the total population. This is examined 4 Empirical Results 
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using a range of well-established inequality indicators such as Gini, Atkinson, Deciles-Ratios 
and poverty measures taken from the FGT-family23 (see Table A3). 
The decline in inequality is strongest comparing figures for the total population before (col-
umn A) and after (column B1) adding all educational transfers to the monetary income (see 
column F1). Including students not living with their parents yields a marginally less equal 
baseline distribution, while adding public transfers to students in tertiary education does re-
duce inequality somewhat further. Again, transfers to secondary education show the strongest 
impact on all applied measures of inequality (see columns C-E). Interestingly, the effect of 
transfers for compulsory education is about the same as the effect of transfers for non-
compulsory education (columns F1-F3).  
While there appears to be no systematic difference according to the Atkinson measure using 
e=0.5 and e=1.5 respectively, the inspection of the decile ratios show a somewhat stronger 
reduction of inequality within the upper half of the income distribution. Furthermore, the 
degree of poverty reduction is higher for the normalized poverty gap (FGT1) than for poverty 
risk rate (FGT0), and increases further with increasing sensitivity of the parameter α, i.e., the 
strongest poverty reduction effect is found for α=2, where overall poverty is reduced by as 
much as 16.5% (see column F1 of Table A3). 
With respect to socio-demographic structures, the social groups benefiting most from public 
education subsidies are, of course, households with younger children and younger persons 
themselves.24 The particular household group benefiting most in absolute and relative terms 
are single-parent households, which form a rather small group. For example, the poverty rate 
for single-parent households declines from about 42% to 20%. On the other hand, households 
with elderly members experience an increase in relative poverty, since by recalculating the 
poverty line after adding education transfers, their relative income position deteriorates sig-
nificantly. Thus, there is a strong decline in economic inequality between different household 
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where n describes the number of persons observed, q represents the number of poor, y is the equivalent income of the poor 
individuals, z describes the poverty threshold and α is the weighting parameter for the individual poverty gap. Setting the 
parameter α equal to zero yields the widely used head-count ratio or poverty incidence (FGT0). FGT(1) is the average 
normalised poverty gap, and FGT(2) is the average squared normalised poverty gap. The larger α is, the greater the degree of 
“poverty aversion”, i.e., the sensitivity to large poverty gaps. Note that the poverty threshold applied to the baseline distribu-
tion is recalculated after adding educational transfers. 
24 For the following exemplary interpretations see Table A4 for analyses focussing on inequality and inequality decomposi-
tion (based on MLD), as well as Table A5 for poverty-related analyses, respectively. 4 Empirical Results 
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types and across the age structure, although the level of between-group inequality is already 
rather low for the baseline distribution. 
With respect to the socioeconomic structure as measured by employment status and educa-
tional level of the household head, the picture is just the opposite. Income inequalities be-
tween different groups of socioeconomic position and educational levels are comparatively 
high in the baseline distribution, and the decrease in inequality due to educational transfers is 
rather small. Persons living in households with a head who is either a blue-collar worker or 
who is unemployed experience a rise in their relative income position, whereas for the posi-
tion of white-collar households remains unchanged, and households of self-employed and 
pensioners loose in this implicit redistribution process. Also, relative poverty is substantially 
reduced among blue-collar workers and the very heterogeneous group of “other” households, 
as well as for self-employed households. Thus, there appears to be a rather small levelling 
effect of economic inequalities across the socioeconomic groups as defined here.  
Indeed, in the case of education levels this effect is close to zero. Whereas the relative income 
position of persons whose household’s head finished tertiary education falls slightly from 
138% of mean income to 136% of mean income, the income position of those whose house-
hold’s head completed no more than general elementary education changes marginally from 
77% to 78%. Also, the decline in poverty rates and the closing of poverty gaps is smallest for 
households with low educational level and highest for persons living in households with 
heads who finished upper secondary education. 
Regarding the change in income inequalities between social groups, there is no significant 
impact of including or excluding students not living with their parents. 
4.3  Who Profits Most from Public Education? – A Regression 
Analysis of Educational Transfers on Family Background 
From our previous cross-sectional analyses, we can conclude that the overall effect of educa-
tional transfers on the income distribution is a reduction of income inequalities and poverty, 
mainly through a redistribution of fictitious income from childless households to those with 
children. However, we have also seen that income inequalities between social classes and 
educational groups are at best slightly reduced or even remain unchanged. The most important 
limitation stems from the fact that the cross-sectional approach chosen here essentially ig-
nores effects arising from the accumulation of educational transfers over the life course that 
are impossible to observe at a single given point in time. Assuming an average annual public 4 Empirical Results 
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education transfer worth the equivalent of €3,000 per beneficiary, the magnitude of this issue 
can be exemplified by comparing an individual who attended the standard nine years of com-
pulsory schooling (€27,000 total lifetime transfers) with an otherwise identical person who 
attended both pre-primary and tertiary education as well (approximately €57,000 total trans-
fers accumulated over a period of 19 years in various educational institutions).25 
As such, one might argue that over the life course, social inequalities in accumulated public 
educational transfers arise from different durations of participation in non-compulsory pre-
primary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. From a cross-sectional perspective, these 
differing durations of educational careers for individuals from different social backgrounds 
will result in differential levels of participation in non-compulsory education. On the other 
hand, the total amount of public educational transfers accumulated across the life course by 
households from different economic and educational backgrounds will also depend heavily on 
whether they have children or potential beneficiaries within the household and how many 
they have. On these grounds, we try to investigate the income effects potentially arising from 
a longer duration of participation in the educational system in a multivariate setting, control-
ling for the presence and number of potential beneficiaries within the household and other 
significant factors. In other words, we use a rather simple cross-sectional regression frame-
work as an approximation of the otherwise unobservable life course perspective, given that 
(representative) panel data over such a long period does not (yet) exist. 
The dependent variable is the total amount of educational transfers in kind received by a 
household in a given year. The most important control variables include the baseline eco-
nomic position and the educational background. The first is based on a combined measure of 
relative income and wealth positions, while the latter also considers information about the 
educational level of the household head’s parents in order to measure the family’s long-term 
income potential arising from higher education. These variables together indicate the baseline 
(social and income) inequalities among the parental generation. Our main hypothesis is that 
the system of public educational transfers not only leads to the well-established intergenera-
tional homogeneity of the educational system but also reinforces social inequality, especially 
through the funding of non-compulsory education.  
                                                                          
25 This is similar in spirit to Grüske (1994) who links lifetime labour income and the advantages of publicly provided educa-
tion taking into account individual tax contributions. Borgloh et al. (2007) also stress the need for longitudinal analyses, but 
their focus is on tertiary education only.   4 Empirical Results 
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There are at least three intervening forces driving the relationship between a household’s 
social background and its educational transfers received that need to be adequately controlled 
for in this set-up (see Figure 2):  
Figure 2: Setting for regression analyses of educational transfers 
First, the number of potential beneficiaries from public education can be expected to be high-
est among low incomes as well as among the least educated groups. For the overall popula-
tion, this is supported by the finding of the highest income quintile comprising the smallest 
number of children (see column D1 in Table A1).26 However, given our interest in inequali-
ties within the population of families, we exclude all post-familial (“empty nest”) households 
from the analyses including those elderly people who never had any children. By restricting 
our sample population to households in an early or middle stage of the family cycle, we take 
on the prospective perspective of the intergenerational transmission and accumulation of 
human capital.27 For the remaining households, we control for the overall existence of chil-
dren, i.e., potential beneficiaries, in the household by means of a Heckman selection model 
(Heckman 1979). Furthermore, in the regression part of the Heckman model, we also control 
for the number of potential beneficiaries within the household. By doing so, we ensure that 
                                                                          
26 Of course, this correlation between welfare position and number of children is affected by the income measure used in the 
descriptive analysis in the previous section, since post-government incomes comprise child-related transfers and tax relief for 
children. Therefore, in the following regression analysis we employ a measure of total income given by the sum of market 
incomes and social transfers deducting direct child allowances. However, we still equalise our measures of income and 
wealth by means of the modified OECD scale, since the interesting effect of economic wellbeing on educational participation 
decisions requires adequate control of the within-household distribution of economic resources. 
27 To identify the stage of a given household in the family cycle, we exploit the available longitudinal and retrospective 
biographical information available on all individuals in SOEP (Frick/Schmitt 2006). It should be noted that households in the 
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the effects of income position and educational transfers indicate educational participation 
behaviour instead of the probability of having (many) children.  
Second, and most interesting, we assume the actual educational participation of these potential 
beneficiaries to vary by economic position and educational background, with higher participa-
tion being more prominent among the economically strongest and the best-educated groups. 
Moreover, these differences are likely to be more immanent at the non-compulsory stages of 
education. This is why we additionally perform separate regression models focussing only on 
compulsory and on non-compulsory educational transfers, respectively. Our main hypothesis 
is that within the compulsory stages of education, there should be no systematic differences 
between different social groups in terms of the total amount of transfers received from public 
education net of the effect of number of children, whereas for non-compulsory education, 
participation rates and choices of school types are expected to be significantly different and to 
be driving the results for the overall sample. 
Third, the overall amount of public transfers for the various educational tracks could have 
been expected to rise with educational level, with higher transfers going to pupils at more 
privileged institutions. However, as we have seen in detail in section 3, there is no systematic 
variation of public transfers per student across different educational tracks. For example, in 
terms of (net) public subsidies received, children attending lowest secondary school do not 
benefit more than children at college-track schools, and students at universities do not receive 
significantly higher subsidies than students at universities of applied sciences after controlling 
for R&D-related costs. The only exception here is the very low transfer per student for voca-
tional education within the dual system, compared to any other kind of non-compulsory edu-
cation28. Effects that arise from the choice between vocational education and higher secondary 
vocational education (e.g., attending Gymnasium) or tertiary education will be captured within 
the overall effects of household backgrounds. In addition, there is considerable variation in 
educational transfers across federal states, especially between city-states, western and eastern 
states, which suggests the need for controlling these regional effects by means of a set of 
state-specific dummy variables. 
Empirical results of the three selection models are documented in detail in Table A6. It should 
be noted that the definition of the dependent variable as well as the definition of the selection 
                                                                          
28 However, this group generally also receives some type of compensation from the employer, which increases with duration 
of apprenticeship.  4 Empirical Results 
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population differ across these models.29 In model 1, the dependent variable is defined as total 
amount of public educational transfers received by the household, and the sample selection 
controls for the existence of at least one household member being aged four to 28, i.e., being a 
potential beneficiary of any type of educational transfer. Models 2 and 3 restrict the respective 
dependent variable to educational transfers for either compulsory education (model 2) or non-
compulsory education (model 3), with an accordingly specified sample selection of house-
holds comprising potential beneficiaries from either compulsory or non-compulsory educa-
tion. 
Figure 3: Regression Coefficients from Heckman Selection Models  
SOEP 2002. Grey bars indicate non significant effects at 10% level. See Table A6 for detailed information. 
The most important regression results are given in Figure 3; complete results and information 
on statistical significance can be obtained from Table A6. All results are net of the number of 
children (in various age brackets) within the household and the federal state in which the 
household lives.30 Effects of family background are close to zero and statistically not signifi-
cant—except for a rather small effect for higher educated household heads—for the model of 
compulsory education, and thus the effects for the overall model are almost entirely driven by 
                                                                          
29 The additional variables identifying the selection process within the framework of the respective selection model are 
dummy variables for “home ownership” and “household head is civil servant” in all three models. 
30 As can be expected, in model 2 (compulsory education) we find high effects of the number of children at the age of com-
pulsory education (8 to 15), whereas the effects are low for the number of children aged 4 to 7 as well as for the number of 
household members aged 16 to 21. In model 3 (non-compulsory education), this picture is completely reversed. Effects for 
lone parents` households are insignificant in both models, i.e., there is no independent effect of lone parenthood net of all 
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the effects of non-compulsory education. We find strong and highly significant effects espe-
cially for the highest economic and educational levels. Controlling for the number of children 
in various age brackets, these households ceteris paribus receive educational transfers worth 
€600 more per year than the poorest and €900 more than the least educated. We also find 
significant additional effects for higher education of the household head’s parents (i.e., the 
grandparent generation), confirming our expectation of a reproduction of the status quo, main-
taining educational elites across the generations. 
In short, these results clearly support the thesis of an intergenerational transmission of 
educational achievement, which has been shown by a number of other research projects 
previously (see, e.g., Schimpl-Neimanns 2000; Fuchs/Sixt 2007). More importantly, however, 
with respect to the impact of public educational transfers on the distribution of a most relevant 
proxy for economic wellbeing, namely income and wealth, these results support a different 
interpretation of our rather simple cross-sectional results presented in section 4.2. Obviously, 
from the cross-section perspective, the impact of adding a fixed amount of public transfers to 
a low baseline income yields a higher relative gain from those transfers for the poor than it 
does for the rich. Moreover, not only in relative but also in absolute terms, low-income 
households receive higher amounts of in-kind transfers from education (see column J1 in 
Table A2). However, this is mainly driven by higher numbers of children in these households 
currently in the educational system. The multivariate setting allows us to control for this and 
to proxy the long-run (life-time) effects of these transfers via socioeconomic status. Here it 
appears that the total amounts of educational transfers from compulsory education do not vary 
across income quintiles and educational levels of the household head once the number of 
children at the age of compulsory education is controlled for. In contrast, we find quite large 
effects for non-compulsory education. It appears that the main driving force behind this 
process lies in the (self-)selection of children from high-income and high-education 
households into institutions of non-compulsory education, reinforcing educational inequalities 
by public subsidies.  
5  Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to estimate income advantages arising from public funding of the 
educational system and to analyse their impact on the income distribution and poverty in 
Germany. The structural distribution of education transfers shows no systematic variance of 
educational transfers across education levels or school types, neither privileging higher educa-5 Conclusion 
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tion nor compensating the underprivileged. Only transfers per child for pre-primary and pri-
mary education as well as for vocational education within the dual system are significantly 
lower than other transfers at the secondary and tertiary levels (excluding costs of research and 
development).  
From a simple point-in-time perspective, the overall impact of public educational transfers on 
income distribution and poverty is a levelling effect. This process is mainly driven by a 
“redistribution” of income from households without children to those with children, the latter 
being the main beneficiaries of these transfers by definition. Transfers to secondary general 
education have the greatest impact in terms of the amount transferred and thus also the 
increase in disposable income and redistribution effects. Whereas the main redistribution 
effects take place through demographic factors (particularly the number of children in the 
household), we find little to no decrease in income inequality across socioeconomic groups 
and in particular across households with different educational levels (based on the household 
head).31  
To further investigate the impact of public educational transfers on economic inequality, we 
performed Heckman selection models in order to disentangle demographic influences from 
educational participation behaviour and to approximate the long-term accumulation effects of 
educational transfers in separate analyses for compulsory and non-compulsory education. Our 
results show that inequalities in educational attainment arising from the unequal participation 
in non-compulsory education play a crucial role. They are strong enough to cancel out the 
levelling effect that arises from the larger number of potential and current beneficiaries in 
lower-income families, and thus to reverse the picture that emerges from descriptive analyses 
taking a solely cross-sectional perspective. Thus, it is the (self-)selection of children from 
high-income and high-education households in institutions of non-compulsory education that 
tends to reinforce not only educational inequalities (which are not within the scope of this 
paper), but economic inequalities between families of different economic and educational 
background as well, thus contributing to long-run societal stratification. From a policy per-
spective, this finding may be relevant for the current discussions underway in Germany on 
raising tuition for higher education and on eliminating the private fees for pre-primary educa-
tion.  
                                                                          
31 Sensitivity analyses show that including students not living with their parents yields a much greater reduction in income 
inequality due to transfers to tertiary education. Excluding these students yields the opposite result of no change or even a 
slight increase in income inequality. However, regarding the change in income inequality between social groups, there is no 
significant impact of including or excluding students not living with their parents. 6 References 
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7  Tables 
Table A1: Population Shares of Beneficiaries 
Quintile  Population share of beneficiaries  % potential beneficiaries 
    A B C  D1  D2  E F G  H1  H2 
   Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  All  All-
Compuls.  Primary Secondary Tertiary  All  All-
Compuls. 
1  (bottom)  23.7  34.8 1.0 47.2 31.9  96.2  92.7 6.2 81.4  100.0 
2  23.4  32.7 1.5 48.2 31.6  95.4  91.2 9.2 83.8  100.0 
3  24.1 33.0  4.0  50.3 31.8 95.7 95.5 23.8 85.0  100.0 
4  19.0 28.8  4.3  42.6 24.3 98.6 94.0 28.8 82.8  100.0 
5  (top) 15.5 20.5  4.7  34.7 19.0 96.5 93.9 38.1 82.7  100.0 
             
All  21.1 29.9  3.1  44.6 27.7 96.4 93.4 20.4 83.2  100.0 
N in Mil.  80,196 
n 28,504 
 
Population: Individuals living in private households with Post-Govt.-Inc.>0 
Column H1: Population aged 4-28 years old 
Note: Primary education includes pre-primary education starting from age 4. 
Source: SOEP 2002 
 
Table A2: Income Advantages from Educational Transfers 
Quintile  Income Share  % Increase in disposable income  Total transfers per capita (not equalised) 
    A  B  C D E F1  F2  G H I J1  J2 
   Baseline  plus transfers  Primary  Secondary Tertiary  All  All  -  Comp.  Primary Secondary Tertiary  All  All  -  Comp. 
1 (bottom)  8.4 9.0  6.7 14.6 0.4 21.7 13.1 273 692 19 984 556 
2 13.7 14.2  3.8 8.0 0.3 12.2 7.0 237 574 25 836 466 
3 17.5 17.9  3.0 6.1 0.6 9.7 5.8 253 559 62 874 501 
4 22.4 22.4  1.9 3.9 0.6 6.3 3.5 200 454 70 724 380 
5 (top)  38.0 36.5  0.8 1.8 0.3 3.0 1.6 156 363 77 597 304 
All 100.0 100.0  2.3 4.9 0.5 7.7 4.4 224 527 51 802 440 
N in Mil.  80,196 
n  28,504 
 
Population: Individuals living in private households with Post-Govt.-Inc.>0 
Note: Primary education includes pre-primary education starting from age 4. 
Source: SOEP 2002 7 Tables 
 35
Table A3: Inequality and Education-Related Transfers 
Inequality 
indices  Value of the Index  Proportional change in % 
   A  B1  B2  B3  C  D  E  F1  F2  F3 
   baseline  plus transf.  compulsory  non-comp.  Primary Secondary Tertiary  (B1-A)/A (B2-A)/A (B3-A)/A 
Gini 0.293 0.273  0.281 0.285 -2.4 -4.7 0.1 -6.8 -4.2 -2.8 
Atkinson 0.5  0.075 0.066  0.069 0.071 -4.7 -8.7 0.1 -12.6 -8.0 -5.5 
Atkinson 1.5  0.225 0.197  0.206 0.213 -5.6 -8.2 0.3 -12.7 -8.4 -5.4 
MLD 0.157 0.136  0.151 0.148 -5.4 -9.3 0.2 -13.6 -4.1 -6.0 
DR: 90/10  3.61 3.30  3.42 3.45 -3.6 -5.9 0.2 -8.4 -5.2 -4.4 
DR: 90/50  1.88 1.76  1.81 1.83 -2.3 -4.4 -0.2 -6.0 -3.7 -2.6 
DR: 50/10  1.92 1.87  1.89 1.89 -1.3 -1.7 0.4 -2.6 -1.5 -1.9 
FGT0 14,78 13,41  14,07 14,07 -2.6 -7.8 0.5 -9.2 -4.8 -4.8 
FGT1 4,24 3,76  3,90 3,99 -4.1 -8.2 1.1 -11.5 -8.0 -5.9 
FGT2 2,02 1,68  1,77 1,85 -6.6 -11.3 1.1 -16.5 -12.1 -8.5 
 
Population: Individuals living in private households with Post-Govt.-Inc.>0 
Note: Primary education includes pre-primary education starting from age 4. 
Source: SOEP 2002 7 Tables 
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 Table A4: Inequality and Education-Related Transfers 
Characteristic of household or household head  A B C D E  F G  H  I 
Household type                        
Older single persons or couples (at least one 65+)  17.2 89 83 0,0  0,134  0,134  0,0 14,6 16,8
Younger single persons or couples (none 65+)  27.1 117 109 0,4  0,180  0,176  -2,5 31,0 35,0
Couple with children up to 18 (no other HH members)  37.3 96 103 16,1  0,136  0,100  -26,2 32,1 27,4
Single-parent household  4.3 62 76 31,1  0,119  0,090  -24,3 3,2 2,8
Other household types  14.2 103 102 6,7  0,147  0,132  -10,7 13,3 13,7
% Within-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,148  0,130  -12,1 94,2 95,8
% Between-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,009  0,006  -37,7 5,8 4,2
                      
Socioeconomic group of HH head                   
Blue-collar worker  19.5 82 86 13,1  0,064  0,046  -28,7 7,9 6,6
White-collar worker  34.0 119 119 8,0  0,106  0,090  -15,3 22,8 22,4
Self-employed 7.4 163 160 5,9  0,197  0,164  -16,4 9,2 8,9
Unemployed 6.8 66 70 14,4  0,152  0,129  -15,3 6,6 6,5
Pensioner 24.8 88 83 1,3  0,124  0,122  -1,2 19,5 22,3
Other 7.4 73 77 13,4  0,314  0,236  -24,9 14,9 12,9
% Within-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,127  0,108  -15,1 81,0 79,6
% Between-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,030  0,028  -7,2 19,0 20,5
                      
Educational level of HH head                   
Tertiary education   21.5 138 136 6,6  0,171  0,149  -12,8 23,5 23,7
Upper secondary education (higher vocational)  14.2 104 104 7,7  0,144  0,116  -19,7 13,0 12,1
Lower secondary education (middle vocational)  45.3 90 91 8,0  0,118  0,102  -13,6 33,8 33,8
General elementary education or less  18.9 77 78 8,8  0,139  0,118  -15,4 16,8 16,4
% Within-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,137  0,117  -14,6 87,0 86,0
% Between-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,020  0,019  -6,7 13,0 14,0
                       
Age of HH member                   
Below 25  26.2 89 97 17,1  0,157  0,117  -26,0 26,2 22,4
25-64 55.9 109 107 6,0  0,156  0,138  -11,7 55,5 56,8
Over 64  17.9 89 83 0,4  0,132  0,132  -0,1 15,1 17,4
% Within-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,152  0,131  -13,7 96,7 96,6
% Between-group inequality  ./. ./. ./. ./. 0,005  0,005  -10,1 3,3 3,4
                       
ALL  100.0 100 100 7,7 0,1574 0,1360 -13,6 100,0 100,0
     
 
  
   
A: Population share        E and F: mean log deviation (2
nd Theil-Index); distributions A and B 
B and C: mean equivalent income relative to the national mean; distributions A and B  G: % change in inequality 
D: % increase in mean equiv. Income        H and I: % contribution to aggregate inequality; distributions A and B 7 Tables 
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 Table A5: Poverty and Education-Related Transfers 
Characteristic of household or household head  A B C D E F G H I  J K L M N O P 
Household type                                              
Older single persons or couples (at least one 65+)  17.2 17.0 22.8 34.3 19.7 29.2  4.0 5.5 38.8 16.2 25.4 1.6 2.2 35.3 14.0  22.7 
Younger single persons or couples (none 65+)  27.1 13.2 15.8 19.9 24.1 31.9  4.0 4.7 18.1 25.3 33.7 1.9 2.2 14.4 25.8  35.3 
Couple with children up to 18 (no other HH members)  37.3 13.0 7.5 -42.2 32.9 20.9  3.9 2.2 -44.3 34.7 21.8 2.0 1.0 -49.8 36.9  22.2 
Single-parent household  4.3 42.0 20.2 -52.0 12.1 6.4  11.3 5.4 -52.0 11.4 6.2 4.7 2.3 -52.1 10.0  5.7 
Other household types  14.2 11.5 10.9 -5.3 11.1 11.6  3.7 3.4 -8.3 12.5 12.9 1.9 1.7 -11.6 13.3  14.1 
                                       
Socioeconomic group of HH head                                    
Blue-collar  worker  19.5 13.3 8.3 -37.4 17.6 12.1 2.8 1.9 -30.2 12.8 10.1 1.1 0.7 -38.4 10.2 7.5 
White-collar  worker  34.0 5.1 4.2 -18.2 11.7 10.5 1.3 1.1 -13.0 10.2 10.1 0.5 0.5 -13.8 9.2 9.5 
Self-employed  7.4 6.0 4.0 -33.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 1.3 -31.6 3.4 2.6 1.1 0.7 -38.1 4.0 3.0 
Unemployed  6.8 44.4 35.3 -20.5 20.5 18.0 13.0 10.1 -22.4 20.9 18.4 5.7 4.6 -20.0 19.5 18.7 
Pensioner 24.8 15.6 20.4 30.3 26.3 37.7  3.8 5.0 31.6 22.5 33.4 1.6 2.1 28.9 20.0  30.8 
Other  7.4 41.6 35.1 -15.7 21.0 19.5 17.2 12.9 -25.1 30.1 25.5 10.1 6.9 -31.4 37.2 30.5 
                                         
Educational level of HH head                                        
Tertiary education   21.5 7.1 6.5 -8.4 10.3 10.4  2.0 1.7 -12.9 9.9 9.8 1.0 0.8 -21.5 10.8  10.1 
Upper secondary education (higher vocational)  14.2 10.6 9.3 -11.7 10.2 9.9  3.9 3.0 -21.8 13.0 11.5 2.3 1.5 -32.8 16.0  12.9 
Lower secondary education (middle vocational)  45.3 14.5 13.2 -9.0 44.4 44.5  3.8 3.4 -10.3 40.4 41.0 1.6 1.4 -12.0 36.8  38.8 
General elementary education or less  18.9 27.4 24.9 -9.1 35.1 35.2  8.2 7.5 -8.7 36.6 37.7 3.9 3.4 -12.3 36.4  38.2 
                                       
Age of HH member                                        
Below 25  26.2 19.4 12.2 -37.1 34.4 23.8  6.3 3.7 -40.4 38.6 26.0 3.1 1.7 -45.0 40.8  26.9 
25-64 55.9 11.9 11.1 -7.0 45.0 46.1  3.3 3.2 -4.8 44.1 47.5 1.6 1.5 -7.1 43.8  48.7 
Over 64  17.9 17.0 22.5 32.7 20.6 30.1  4.1 5.6 36.1 17.3 26.6 1.7 2.3 32.3 15.4  24.4 
                                       
ALL  100.0 14.8 13.4 -9.2 100.0 100.0 4.2 3.8 -11.5 100.0 100.0 2.0 1.7 -16.5 100.0  100.0 
  
A: Population share       
B and C: Poverty index FGT0 (poverty rate);  
distributions A and B  
G and H: Poverty index FGT1 (norm. poverty gap); 
distributions A and B 
L and M: Poverty index FGT2;  
distributions A and B 
D: % change in poverty index FGT0  I: % change in poverty index FGT1  N:% change in poverty index FGT2 
E and F: % contribution to aggregate poverty (FGT0); 
distributions A and B 
J and K: % contribution to aggregate poverty (FGT1); 
distributions A and B 
O and P: % contribution to aggregate poverty (FGT2); 
distributions A and B 7 Tables 
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Table A6: Regression of Educational Transfers per Household on Family Background (Heckman Selection)  
      Model 1: ALL  Model 2: COMPULSORY  Model 3: NON-
COMPULSORY 
      Regression  Selection  Regression Selection Regression Selection 
Bottom Quintile = Ref.                   
2. Quintile  -98       -0.49*** -50  -0,32***  -125  -0,40***
3.  Quintile  110 -0.89*** 71 -0,66***  120 -0,66***
4. Quintile  283**  -1.22*** 126  -0,79***  318** -0,95***
Economic Position 
(averaged relative 
income and wealth 
position) 
Top Quintile  660*** -1.48*** 113  -1,07***  745*** -1,03***
Low = Ref.           
Medium 43  0,05  -47  -0,03  67  0,09* 
Higher Vocational  298** -0,02  -70  -0,06  298** 0,06 
Educational Level of 
Household Head 
Highest 795*** 0,00  151*  0,10*  914*** 0,03 
Parents of HH Head: 
Higher Education 
 
yes 239** 0.13** 82  0.05  230*  0,16***
Migration Background  yes  -75  0,04  -28  0,19***  -6  -0,03 
... 4-7  1924*** --  881*** --  1309*** -- 
... 8-15  4585*** --  4255*** --  162** -- 
... 16-21  2831*** --  214*** --  2434*** -- 
No. of Persons aged ...  
in Household 
... 22-28  594*** --  -86  --  321*** -- 
Federal States (dummy)  controlled for  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
no. of adults  --  1.38*** --  0.04**  --  1.65***
age  -- -0.10*** --  0.33***  -- -0.23***
age^2  -- 0.001*** --  -0.004***  -- 0.002***
Home  Owner  -- 0.56*** -- 0.75***  -- 0.21***
Identifying Sample 
Selection 
HH-Head is Civil Servant  --  0.23*** --  -0.01  --  0.21***
Constant     840*** 1.32*** 940*** -6.98***  997*** 3.06***
R-Squared     0.71  0.84   0.33
rho      -0.64 0.03 -0.49 
LR-Test (rho=0): Chi-Squared (p-value)  167 (p=0.000)  -17 (p=1.000)  57 (p=0.000) 
censored / uncensored obs.  2555 5494 5590  2459  3762  4287 Observations 
total observations   8049 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Model Dependent  Variable Selection  Variable 
1 ALL  Total educational transfers per household  HH with potential beneficiaries (aged 4-28) 
2 COMPULSORY  Sum of educational transfers for compulsory education only, per HH  HH with potential beneficiaries of compulsory education (aged 8-15) 
3 NON-COMPULSORY  Sum of educational transfers for non-compulsory education only, per HH  HH with potential beneficiaries of non-compulsory education (aged 4-7 and 16-28) 
 In all models, households in the post-familial stage of the family cycle and without potential beneficiaries are excluded.  
 